This week we watched The Night Is Short, Walk On Girl. One of our readers recommended this film a month or two ago, after rachel mentioned seeing Yuasa’s Mind Game in a weekly update
' Erdmann and Jacques read : " grand Seigneur." — Tk. 2 Jan. 26, 1699. — Tr.
8 Erdmann and Jacques read : "curieux"; Gerhardt reads; "observatif." -Tk.
sanguinity between themselves if husband and wife were taken as one and the same person.
§ 3. Ph. The foundation of a relation is sometimes a moral right, as the relation of a general of an army or of a citizen. These relations depending upon the agreements men have made between themselves are voluntary or by institution, and may be distinguished from the natural. Sometimes the two correlatives have each its name, as patron and client, general and soldier. But it is not so always ; as, for example, it is not so in the case of those who are related to the chancellor.
Til. [There are sometimes natural relations which men have invested and enriched with certain moral relations, as, for example, children have the right to claim the legitimate por- tion of the estate of their fathers or mothers ; young persons are under certain restraints and the aged have certain immu- nities. But it also happens that some relations are taken as natural which are not so ; as when the laws say that the father is he who married the mother within the time which makes it possible for the child to be attributed to him ; and this substitution of the instituted in the place of the natural is sometimes only presumiMon, that is to say, a judgment which causes that to pass as true which perhaps is not so, whilst its falsity is not at all proved. Thus it is that the maxim : pater est quern miptioi demonstrant is understood in Roman law and among the most of the peoples where it is received. But they tell me that in England it avails nothing in proving his alibi; provided he has been in one of the three kingdoms, so that the presumption in that case changes into fiction or into what some doctors call prcBsumtio juris et de jure.'\
§ 4. Ph. A moral relation is the conformity or disagreement which is found between the voluntary acts of men and a rule which makes us judge whether they are morally good or bad. § 5. And moral good or moral evil is the conformity or the opposition which is found between voluntary acts and a cer- tain law which brings upon us good or evil (physical) by the will and power of the lawgiver (or of him who wills to maia- tain the law) and it is this we call reward and punishment.
Th. [Authors, as clever as he whose views you, sir, repre- sent, are allowed to adapt their terms as they think proper, But it is also true that according to this notion one and the
same act would be morally good and morally bad at the same time under different legislators, entirely as our clever author understood virtue above as that which is praised, and conse- quently the same act would be virtuous or not according to the opinions of men. Now that not being the ordinary sense that is given to morally good and virtuous acts, I prefer for myself, to take as the measure of moral good and of virtue the invariable rule of reason which God is charged with main- taining. We can also be assured that by his mediation all moral good becomes physical,' or as the ancients say, every thing virtuous is useful^; while in order to express the notion of the author, it would be necessary to say that moral good or evil is an imposed or instituted good or evil, which he who has the power tries to make us follow or shun by punishments and rewards. The good is that which by the general institu- tion of God is conformed to nature or to reason.]
§ 7. Ph. There are three sorts of Imvs : the divine law, the civil lam, and the law of opinion or reputation. The first is the rule of sins or duties, the second of actions criminal or innocent, the third of virtues or vices.
Til. [According to the ordinary sense of terms virtues and vices differ from duties and sins only as habits differ from
i really like how whimsical the animation is and the way they express things like the characters walking from place to place, or the exaggerated motions for simple actions like reaching or swallowing
1 What does Leibnitz liere mean by " physical " ? Possibly " physical " is here equivalent to "real," i.e. actual, concrete, objectively realized as distin- guished from that which is purely subjective and abstract, and exists in idea only (c/. Bk. U., chap.. 27, § 9, Th.propefin., ante, p. 247, line 7, where the two terms are united in one phrase " real and physical," and seem to be mutually interpretative and emphatic). Or, possibly, "physical" is here used in the sense of "natural," the meaning of the passage being that moral good is realized by the mediation of God through the natural forces and in accord with the natural laws of the universe, which with Leibnitz have their ultimate source and ground in the nature of God and his choice of " the best and most perfect," as the universal principle of creation. The true view of the world is, according to Leibnitz, both pbysico-mechanical and moral-teleological, the two finding a higher unity in this principle of " the best and most perfect," the moral-teleological prevailing in case of collision, because of this princi- ple and because the physical is in its last analysis and ground spiritual and possessed of an inner teleological character which is realized by means of mechanism while resting upon the principle of the divine choice of the best. Cf. Discours de Metaphysique, § 19 sq., Gerhardt, 4, 444 sg. ; letter to Bayle, G. 3, 54; Erdmann, 106. —Tr.
2 Cf. Cicero, De Offlciis, Bk. III., chaps. 3 and 7, who shows on the author- ity of Panaetius and others that the virtuous and the useful — honestum and ■utile — are identical, a chief point of the Stoic philosophy. Cf. also Zeller, Die Philos. d. Griech., III., 1 [Vol. 5] , p. 212, 3d ed. 1880, — Tb.
actions, and virtue and vice are not understood as something dependent upon opinion.^ A great sin is called a crmie, and the innocent is not opposed to the criminal but to the blame- worthy. The divine law ^ is of two sorts, natural and positive. Civil law is positive. The law of reputation deserves the name of law only improperly, or is comprised under the natural law, as though I said, the law of health, the law of the family, when actions naturally attract some good or evil, as the approbation of another, health, gain.]
§ 10. Ph. The claim is in fact everywhere made that the terms virtue and vice signify actions good and bad in their nature, and so far as they are really applied in this sense, vir- tue agrees perfectly with the divine (natural) law. But what- ever the claims of men, it is evident^ that these names, con- sidered in their particular applications, are constantly and solely attributed to such or such actions as in each country or in each society are reputed honorable or shameful : otherwise men would condemn themselves. Thus the measure of what is called virtue and vice is this approbation or this contempt, this esteem or this blame, which is formed by a secret or tacit consent. For although men united in political societies have resigned into the hands of the public the disposition of all their forces, so that they cannot employ them against their fellow-citizens beyond what the law permits, they nevertheless always retain the power of thinking well or ill, of approval or disapproval.
Th. [If the clever author, who thus explains himself, should declare with you, sir, that it has pleased him to assign this present arbitrary nominal definition to the terms virtue and vice, we could only say that it is allowed him in theory for the
1 Leibnitz maintains, as against Locke's theory of relativity, tlie absolute and objective character ol Moral Law. It is objective and universal, not sub- jective and particular ; not dependent ujjon the opinions of men, but grounded in "the general institution of God," and ultimately in his infinitely perfect moral nature, and is thus valid for and binding upon all moral beings as such. This is Moral Law absolute and ideal which changes not ; it is progressively and approximately attained or realized in the history of the individual and the race according to men's apprehension of its nature and requirements and their strengtii of purpose and effort in its pursuit. — Tr.
2 Cf. the discussion of Moral Law, in Principles and Practice of Morality, pp. 79 sq., by E. G. Robinson, D.D., LL.D., Ex-President ot Brown University. Boston: Silver, Burdett & Co., 1888. — Tr.
8 Locke has : " visible," Philos. Works, Vol. 1, p. 488 (Bohn's ed.). — Tk.
oonvenience of expression for want perhaps of other terms ; but we shall be obliged to add that this meaning is not conformed to usage, nor indeeduseful for edification, and that it would sound ill in the ears of many people, if any one should intro- duce it into practical life and conversation, as this author seems himself to admit in his preface. But it is (for us) to go on farther here, and although you admit that men claim to speak of that which is naturally virtuous or vicious according to immutable laws, you maintain that in fact they mean to speak only of that which depends on opinion. But it seems to me that by the same reasoning you could further maintain that truth and reason and all that could be named as most real, depends upon opinion, because men are mistaken when they judge of it. Is it not better then on all accounts to say, that men understand by virtue as by truth, that which is conformed to nature, but that they are mistaken often in its application ; besides they are mistaken less than they think, for what they praise ordinarily deserves it in certain respects. The virtue of drinking, i.e. of well carrying wine, is an advantage, which served Bonosus, in conciliating the Barbarians and in drawing from them their secrets.^ The nocturnal powers of Hercules, in which the same Bonosus claimed to resemble him, were no less a perfection. The craft of thieves was praised among the Spartans, and it is not the skill, but the imseasonable use which has been made of it, which is blamable, and those whom we harass in (time of) complete peace may serve sometimes as excellent partisans in time of war. Thus all depends upon the application and the good or bad use of the advantages you pos- sess. It is also very often true and should not be taken as a very strange thing, that men condemn themselves, as when they do what they blame in others, and there is often a contradiction between actions and words which scandalizes the public, when what a magistrate or preacher does and defends leaps to the eyes of the whole world.]
§ 11.^ Ph. Everywhere that which passes as virtue is that which is thought worthy of praise. Virtue and praise are often designated by the same name. Su7it hie etiam sua prwmia laudi, says Vergil (Aen. 1. 461) and Cicero, Nihil habet natura
i really do not like the way it addresses anime sleaziness in like. a “boys will be boys” way
1 C/. Voplscus, Script, hist. Avcjust., Vol. 2, pp. 213, 214, ed. Peter. — Te.
2 Gerhardt and Locke; Erdmann and Jacques have § 12. —Tr.
praestanlius quam honestatem, quam laudem, qiiam dignitatem, quam decus} {Qucest. Tuscul. Bk. 2. chap. 20) and he adds a little after : Hisce ego pluribus nominihiis unam rem declarari volo}
Th. [It is true that the ancients have designated virtue by the name honesty (I'Jionneste), as when they have praised M^ coctnvi generoso pectus lionesto} It is true also that honesty {Vhonneste) has its name of honor or of praise. But this means not that virtue is that which is praised but that it is that which is worthy of praise and which depends upon truth, and not upon opinion.]
Ph. Many do not think at all seriously of the laiv of God, or hope that they will one day be reconciled with its author, and as regards the laiv of the state they flatter themselves with im- punity. But they do not think that he who does anything contrary to the opinions of those with whom he associates, and to whom he wishes to commend himself, can avoid the pain of their censure and of their disdain. No one who retains any consciousness of his own nature can live in society constantly desjiised ; this is the force of the law of reputation.
Th. [I have already said that it is not so much the pain of a law, as a natural pain which the act draws upon itself. It is, however, true that many people are but little concerned about it, because ordinarily, if they are despised by some on account of some blameworthy act, they find accomplices or at least partisans, who do not despise them, if they are ever so little commendable in some other respect. They forget even acts the most infamous, and it often suffices to be bold and im- pudent like that Phormio of Terence in order that all may be overlooked. If excommunication produced a truly constant and general contempt, it would have the force of this law of which our author speaks : and it had in fact this force with the first Christians and for them took the place of the right, which they lacked, to punish the guilty ; nearly as artisans maintain certain customs among themselves in spite of the laws, through
1 The quotation is not exact. Cf. op. cit., ed. Klotz, Lipsife, B. G. Teut- ner, 1870, where the text reads thus: "Nihil enim hahet praestantius, nihil quod magis expetat quam Iionestatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam decus. Hisce ego pluribus nominibus unam rem declarari volo, sed utor, ut quam maxime signifieem, pluribus." — Tr.
the contempt which they show for those who do not observe them. And it is this which has also maintained duels con- trary to the ordinances. It would be desirable for the public to agree with itself and with reason in its praise and blame ; and that the great above all do not encourage the bad by laugh- ing at their bad actions, in which it oftenest seems that not he who has done them, but he who has suffered them is punished by contempt and ridiculed. We shall see also generally that men despise not so much vice as weakness and misfortune. Thus the law of reputation would need to be greatly reformed, and also to be better observed.]
§ 19. Ph. Before leaving the consideration of relations, I would remark that we usually have a notion as clear or clearer of the relation than of its ground. If I believed that Sempronia took Titus from beneath a cabbage, as they used to tell little children, and that afterwards she had had Caius in the same manner, I should have as clear a notion of the relation of brother between Titus and Caius, as if I had all the knowledge of the midwives.
Th. But when they once said to a child, that his little brother, who had just been born, had been drawn from a well (a reply which they make use of in Germany to satisfy the curiosity of children upon this subject) the child replied that he wondered that they did not throw him back again into the same well when he cried so much and disturbed his mother. The fact is this explanation did not make him know any rea^ son for the love his mother showed for the child. We can say then that those who do not know the ground of relations have only concerning them what I call thoughts, surd in part and insufficient, although these thoughts may suflB.ce in certain respects and upon certain occasions.]
it is really cool in how it weaves various symbolisms and motifs into the work. the way modern items of artifice got woven into folk remedies was interesting. the way the spreading cold represented the way one’s own life touched others, in both positive and negative… admittedly part of it was a bit out of tune from what i could understand so i didn’t get it entirely but that aspect was neat
or CLEAK AND OBSCUKE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED IDEAS
§ 2. Ph. We come now to some differences of ideas. Our simple ideas are clear when they are such as the objects them- selves, from whence they are received, represent or may
represent them with all the circumstances requisite to a well- ordered sensation or perception. While the memory retains them in this way, they are in this case clear ideas, and so far as they lack this original exactness or have lost anything so to speak of their first freshness, and are, as it were, tarnished or faded by time, so far are they obscure. Complex ideas are dear, when the simple ideas which compose them are clear and the number and order of these simple ideas are fixed.
Th. [In a brief discourse on ideas,^ true or false, clear or obscure, distinct or confused, inserted in the " Leipsic Acts " of the year 1684, I have given a definition of dear ideas, common to the simple and complex and which gives the rear son of what you say here. I said then that an idea is clear when it suffices to recognize and distinguish the thing: as when I have a very clear idea of a color, I shall not take another instead of that which I ask for, and if I have a clear idea of a plant, I shall distinguish it among other neighboring ones; without this the idea is obscure. I believe that we have but few perfectly clear ideas of sensible things. There are colors which approach each other in such a waj'" that we can- not distinguish them by memory, and yet we will sometimes distinguish them by placing one near the other. And when we think we have fully described a plant, we can bring one from the Indies which will have all we have put into our description and which will not cease making itself known as a different species : thus we can never perfectly determine species infamce, or the lowest species.]
§ 4." Ph. As a dear idea is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception as it receives from an external object operating duly upon a well-disposed organ ; so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference, which distinguishes it from every other idea ; and a confused idea is that which cannot be suf&ciently distinguished from another from which it should be different.
Th. [According to this notion which you give of the dis- tinct idea, I do not see how you distinguish it from the clear idea. This is why I have been wont to follow here the lan- guage of Descartes, with whom an idea may be clear and con-
1 ileditationes de Cognitione, Veriiate et Ideis. Cf. ante, p. 14, note 2; p. 227, note 3. — Tr.
fused at tlie same time ; and such are the ideas of sensible qualities, appropriate to the organs, such as color or heat. They are clear, for they are easily recognized and distinguished the one from the other, but they are not distinct, because they are not distinguished by what they include. Tlius we cannot give a definition of them. We make them known only by examples, and for the rest we must say it is an indefinite somewhat, until we can decipher its contexture. Thus although in our view distinct ideas distinguish one object from another ; nevertheless, as the ideas clear, but confused in themselves, do so also, we call distinct not all those which are very discrimi- nating or which distinguish objects, but those which are well distinguished, i.e. which are distinct in themselves and dis- tinguish in the object the marks which make it known, which an analysis or definition of it gives ; otherwise we call them confused. And in this sense the confusion which reigns in ideas can be exempt from blame, being an imperfection of our nature; for we cannot discern the causes, for example, of odors and tastes, nor the content of these qualities. This confusion can, however, be blameworthy, when it is important and within my power to have distinct ideas, as, for example, if I took adulterated gold as the true, for want of making the necessary assays which contain the marks of good gold.
§ 5. Ph. But you wUl say that there is no idea confused (or rather according to your view, obscure) in itself-' for it can be only such as it is perceived by the mind, and that distin- guishes it sufficiently from all others. § 6. And in order to remove this difficulty it is needful to know that the defect of ideas is related to names, and what renders it faulty is the fact that it can as well be designated by another name as the one which we use to express it.
Th. [It seems to me that we ought not to make this depend upon names. Alexander the Great had seen (they say) in a dream a plant able to cure Lysimachus, which has since been called Lysimachia, because it effectually cured this friend of the king. When Alexander had a quantity of plants brought, among which he recognized that which he had seen in his dream, if unfortunately he had not had a sufficient idea of it to recognize it and had needed as Nebuchadnezzar a I Erdmann and Jacques omit : " en elle meme." — Tb.
-avery
Daniel to enable him to recall his dream, it is plain that the idea he would have had of it would have been obscure and imperfect (for it is thus I should prefer to call it rather than confused), not for want of appositeness in a certain name, for there was none, but for want of application to the thing, i.e. to the plant which was to heal. In this case Alexander would be reminded of certain circumstances, but he would have been in doubt about others ; and the name serving us to designate anything makes us, when we fail in the api^lication to names, fail ordinarily in regard to the thing which is promised by this name.]
§ 7. Ph. As complex ideas are the most subject to this imperfection, it may arise from the fact that the idea is composed of too small a number of simple ideas, as is, for example, the idea of an animal which has the skin spotted, (a term) which is too general, and which does not suffice to dis- tinguish the lynx, the leopard, or the panther, which are besides distinguished by particular names.
Th. [If we were in the condition Adam was in before he had given names to the animals, this defect would not cease to have place. For supposing we knew that among the spotted animals there is one which has extraordinarily pene- trating sight, but that we did not know whether it is a tiger or a lynx, or some other species ; it is an imperfection not to be able to distinguish it. Thus the question is not so much about the name as about that which may give occa- sion for it, and which renders the animal worthy of a particu- lar name. It thereby appears also that the idea of a spotted animal is good in itself, and without confusion and obscurity, when it is to serve only the genus ; but when joined with some other idea which is not sufficiently remembered it is to designate the species, the complex idea is obscure and imperfect.]
§ 8. Ph. There is an opposite defect when the simple ideas which make up the complex idea are sufficient in number, but too confused and involved, like some pictures, which appear so confused that they must be only the representation of the sky covered with clouds, in which case also we could not say that there is confusion any more than if it were aaiother pic- ture made to imitate that one ; but when we say that this
picture should make us see a portrait, we shall have reason to say that it is confused because we cannot say whether it is that of a man, or of a monkey, or of a fish, but it may be that when we look at it in a cylindrical mirror, the confusion will disappear, and that we shall see that it is a Julius Caesar. Thus some mental paintingH (if I may so express myself) can- not be called confused from any way in which the parts are joined together ; for whatever these paintings are, they can obviously be distinguished from every other, until they are ranked under some ordinary name, to which we cannot see that they belong any more than to some other name of a different signification.
Th. [This picture whose parts we see distinctly, without noticing the result to which they in a certain way point, resembles the idea of a heap of stones, which is truly confused not only in your sense, but also in mine, so far as we have distinctly conceived their number and other properties. If there were thirtj'-six of them (for example), we would not know, looking at them heaped together without arrangement, that they may produce a triangle or indeed a square, as in fact they can, because thirty-six is a square as well as a tri- angular number. Thus it is that, in looking at a figure of a thousand sides, we shall have only a confused idea of it, until we know the number of the sides which is the cube of ten. The question, then, is not of names but of the distinct proper- ties which are to be found in the idea when we have cleared up its confusion. And it is sometimes difficult to find the key, or the manner of looking at it from a certain point, either by the intervention of a certain mirror or glass in order to see the purpose of him who has caused the thing.]
§ 9. Ph. It cannot be denied that there is yet a third defect in ideas, which depends in truth upon the bad use of names ; it is when our ideas are uncertain or undetermined. Thus we may see every day men who, making no difficulty of availing themselves of the ordinary words of their mother tongue, before they have learned their precise meaning, change the idea which they attach to them almost as often as they use them in their discourse. § 10. Thus we see how much names contribute to this denomination of ideas distinct and confused, and, without the consideration of distinct names
understood as signs of distinct things, it will be very difficult to say what a confused idea is.
Th. [I have, however, just explained it without considering the names, whether in the case where the confusion is under- stood with you as what I call obscurity, or in that where it is understood in my sense as the defect in the analysis of the notion we have. And I have also shown that every obscure idea is in fact indeterminate or uncertain, as in the example of the spotted animal we have seen, where we know that some- thing further must be added to this general notion, without clearly remembering it ; so that the first and third defect which you have specified come to the same thing. It is, how- ever, very true that the abuse of words is a great source of errors, for a kind of error in calculating occurs therefrom, as if in calculating we did not notice carefully the place of the counter, or if we wrote the figures so badly that we could not distinguish a 2 from a 7, or if we omitted or changed them through inadvertence. This abuse of words consists either in not connecting ideas with the whole or in connecting them with an imperfect one, of which a part is empty and abides so to speak in blank ; and in these two cases there is a certain void and surd in the thought which is filled only by the name. Or, finally, the defect is in attaching to the word different ideas, whether we are uncertain which should be chosen, which makes the idea obscure as well as when a part of it is surd ; or whether we select them by turns, and avail ourselves sometimes of one, sometimes of the other as the sense of the same word in one and the same course of reasoning in a way capable of causing error, without consider- ing that the ideas do not agree. Thus the uncertain thought is either void and without idea, or fluctuates between several ideas. This does harm whether -^ we wish to designate some definite thing or whether we wish to give a word a certain sense corresponding either to that of which we have already availed ourselves, or to that which others have used, above all in ordinary language, common to all, or to the artisans. And from this arise an infinite number of vague and vain dis- putes in conversation, in lecture-rooms, and in books, which we
1 Erdmann and Jacques omit: " soit qu'on veuille designer quelque cliose determinee," the reading of Gerliardt. — Tk.
Wog was fun! There was a girl and she walked and went on all sorts of cool adventures, drinking drinks, going on a train, doing a slippery eel dance, going to a used book store, and much more. The guy in the film was more annoying, he didn’t drink anything and only chased after the girl but he at least had some introspection somehow. The side plots were pleasant as well, I especially liked how love was portrayed in that it could be sincere and yet fickle. (I love nuanced views of love.)
may sometimes avoid by distinctions, but which most fro- quently serve only to confuse the more, by putting in the place of a vague and obscure term other terms still more vague and obscure, as those often are whicli the pliilosopliers employ in their distinctions, without having good definitions of them.]
§ 12. Ph. If there is any other confusion in ideas, than this which has a secret relation to names, this at least casts more disorder than any other into the thoughts and discourse of men.
Th. [I agree, but most frequently some notion of the thing and the purpose which we have in availing ourselves of the name is mixed with it ; as, for example, when we speak of the church, many have in view a government, while others think of the truth of the doctrine. J
Ph. The way to prevent this confusion is constantly to apply the same name to a certain mass of simple ideas united in a fixed number and into a determined order. But as that suits neither the laziness nor the vanity of men, and as it can be used only in the discovery and the defence of the truth, which is not always the end they propose to themselves, such precision is one of the things that is rather to be wished than hoped for. The vague application of names to ideas inde- terminate, variable, and almost wholly empty (in the surd thoughts) is on one side a covering of our iguorance and on the other a confusing and embarrassing of others, which passes as true learning and as a mark of superiority in point of knowledge.
Th. [The aifectation of elegance and wit has further con- tributed much to this intricacy of language ; for in order to express thoughts beautifully and agreeably we make no diffi- culty of giving words in a tropical manner a sense different from the ordinary, sometimes more general or more limited, which is called synecdoche, sometimes transferred according to the relations of things whose names we change, either by concurrence in metonymy, or by comparison in metaphor, not to speak of irony, which makes use of a term in a sense directly opposite to its real meaning. Thus these changes are named when recognized ; but they are recognized only rarely. And in this indeterminateness of language, in which there is
lacking a kind of law wliicli regulates the meaning of words, as tliere is somethiug in the title of the digests of the Eoman Law, De Verbormn Siynijicationibus, persons the most judic- ious, when they write for ordinary readers, would be deprived of that which gives charm and force to their expression if they should confine themselves rigorously to the fixed mean- ings of terms. They need only take care that their variation does not cause any error or false reasoning to spring up. The distinction of the ancients between the exoteric,^ i.e. popular, and the acroamatic ^ mode of writing, which belongs to those who are occupied in the discovery of truth, has place here. And if any one wished to write in mathematical fashion in metaphysics or ethics, nothing would prevent him from so doing with rigor. Some have professed to do this, and we have a promise of mathematical demonstrations outside of mathematics ; but it is very rare that they have been success- ful. This is, I believe, because they are disgusted with the trouble it is necessary to take for a small number of readers where they could ask as in Persius : Quis leget haec, and reply : Vel duo vel nemo.'^ I believe, however, that if they would undertake it in the proper way they would not be likely to repent it. And I have been tempted to try it.]
§ 13. Ph. You will agree with me, however, that complex ideas may be very clear and distinct in one aspect, and very obscure and confused in another.
Th. [There is no reason to doubt it ; for example, we have very distinct ideas of a good part of the solid visible parts of the human body, but we have but few of the liquids which enter therein.]
Ph. If a man speaks of a figure of a thousand sides, the
1 Cf. Leibnitz, De Stilo philos. Nizolii, Gerhardt, Vol. 4, p. 146 ; Erdmann, p. 03. " Acroamatic" {ante, p. 42), from aKpdofia, anything heard, the verb inpoSo-eai, the regular word for hearing or attending lectures, the adjective dicfjoafiaTiKO!, designed for hearing only, and, when used of the doctrines of phllosoi)hers, meaning the esoteric, i.e. the doctrines in their most rigorous and exact scientific form, their custom being to give these orally to their pupils, while treating tliem in a more popular, exoteric manner in their writ- ings. Such was the method of Plato and of Aristotle, one of whose works is called <\>v<Tm'ii iupdao-is. Schaarschmldt refers to Bernays, Die Dialoqe d. Aris- totles, p. 30 sq. Berlin, 1S63, and Madvlg, Excursus VII. to his edition of Cicero's De Finibus. — Tr.
Anyways ten out of twelve, was cute and fun although at the end i felt it got too surreal and that put me out of it and also that one guy was too pervy. Protagonist girl had insuppressible whimsy and I hope I can follow the same mindset :3
idea of this figure may be very obscure in his mind, altliough that of the number may be very distinct therein.
Th. [This example is not in point here ; a regular polygon of a thousand sides is known as distinctly as the millenary number, because we may discover and demonstrate all kinds of truth.]
Ph. But we do not have a precise idea of a figure of a thousand sides, so that we can distinguish it from another, which has only nine hundred ninety-nine.
Th. [This example shows that you here confound the idea with the image. If any one places before me a regular poly- gon, sight and imagination cannot make me comprehend the millenary therein ; I have only a confused idea both of the figure and of its number, until I distinguish the number by counting. But having found it, I know very well the nature and the properties of the proposed polygon, as far as they are those of the chiliagon, and consequently I have this idea of it ; but I cannot have the image of a chiliagon, and it would be necessary to have senses and imagination more exquisite and better exercised in order to distinguish it thereby from a polygon which had one side less. But the knowledge of figures no more than that of numbers depends upon the imag- ination, although it is of service therein ; and a mathematician can know exactly the nature of a nonagon and a decagon, because he has the means of making and examining them, though he could not discern them at sight. It is true that a workman or an engineer, who does not perhaps know their nature sufficiently, can have this advantage beyond a great geometer that he can discern them by sight only without measuring them, as there are some street-porters' (faquins) or pedlers, who will state the weight of what they are to carry within a pound, in which respect they will surpass the most skilful statistician in the world. It is true that " this empiri- cal knowledge acquired by a long practice may be very useful for prompt action, such as an engineer very often needs to perform because of the danger to which he is exposed in delaying. But this clear image or this feeling which we may
lErdmann and Jacques omit: "faquins ou," the reading ot Gerliardt. — Tr. ^ Erdmann and Jacques omit: " II est vray que," tlie reading of Gerhardt. -Tk.
have of a regular decagon or of a weight of ninety-nine pounds consists only in a confused idea, since it is of no avail in dis- covering the nature and properties of this weight or of this regular decagon, which demands a distinct idea. And this example conduces to the better understanding of the differ- ence of ideas, or rather that of the idea and the image.]
§ 15.^ Ph. Another example : We are led to believe that we have a positive and complete idea of eternity, which is as much as to say that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly known in our idea ; but, however great may he the duration that is represented, as it is a question of an extension without limits, there always remains a part of the idea beyond what is represented which continues obscure and undetermined ; and thence it comes that, in discussions and reasonings concerning eternity or any other infinite, we are apt to involve ourselves in manifest absurdities.
Th. [This example does not appear to me to square with your design either ; but it is very appropriate to mine, which is to disabuse you of your notions on this point. For the same confusion of the image with the idea reigns here. We have a complete or just idea of eternity, since we have a definition of it, although we have no image of it. But the idea of the infinite is not formed by the composition of parts, and the errors which we meet in reasoning upon the infinite do not arise from the defect of the image.^]
§ 16.^ Ph. But is it not true that when we speak of the infinite divisibility of matter, although we have clear ideas of the division, we have only very obscure and very confused ideas of the parts ? For I ask whether a man taking the
1 Erdmann and Jacques have § 25. Gerhardt and Locke, Philos. Worlcs, Vol. ], p. 505 (Bohn's ed.), have § 15. —Tr.
-recima from minfeub
2 The difficulties and errors in the discussion of the infinite arise not "from the defect of the image" but from the attempt to imagine or picture that which can only be thought. We can think the infinite and absolute, but we cannot form an adequate image or picture of it. The " confusion of the image with the idea," which Leibnitz here speaks of, is one of the causes vitiating much of the "reasoning upon the infinite" in the history of thought, and lying at the basis of all theories, like those of Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer, which maintain the impossilnlity on man's part of a knowledge of the infinite. Of. John Caird, An Introduction to the Philos. of Religion, p. 36. New York; Macmillan & Co., 1880. — Tk.
8 So Gerhardt and Loeke, Philos. Works (Bohn's ed.), Vol. 1, p. 505; Erd- mann has § 18 ; Jacques § 30. — Tk.
smallest atom of dust he ever saw has any distinct idea of the difference between the one hundred thousandth' and the millionth part of this atom ?
Th. It is the same qui pro quo of the image for the idea, which I am astonished to see so confused. The possession of an image of so great a smallness is not at all the question. It is impossible according to the present constitution of our body, and if we could have it, it would be much the same as that of those things which now appear to us apperceptible ; but in compensation what is now the object of our imagination would escape us and become too great to be imagined. Size has no images in itself, and those which it has depend only upon comparison with the organs and other objects, and it is useless here to employ imagination. Thus it appears by all that you, sir, have said to me here that you are ingenious in devising difficulties without reason, in demanding more than is necessary.]
§ 1. Ph. Ideas in relation to things are real or fantastical, adequate or inadequate, true or false. By real ideas I under- stand those which have a foundation in nature, and which are conformed to a real being, to the existence of things, or to their archetypes ; otherwise they are fantastic or chimerical.
Th. [There is a little obscurity in this explication. The idea may have a foundation in nature, without being con- formed to this foundation, as when we maintain that the per- ceptions we have of color and heat do not resemble any orig- inal or archetype. An idea is also real when it is possible, although no existing being corresponds thereto. Otherwise if all the individuals of a species were lost, the idea of the species would become chimerical.]
§ 2. Ph. Simple ideas are all real, for, although [according to many] whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than is pain, yet their ideas are in us as effects of powers connected lErdmann and Jacques read: "la lO.OOOme et la lOOOme." — Tr.
with external things, and these constant effects serve us in distinguisliing things as much as if they were exact images of that which exists in the things themselves.
Th. [I have examined this point above : but it appears thereby that you do not always demand a conformity to an archetype, and, according to the opinion (which, however, I do not approve) of those who think that God has arbitrarily assigned us ideas, destined to mark the qualities of objects without any resemblance or even natural relation, there would be also in that case less conformity between our ideas and the archetypes than there is between the words which we use by institution in language and the ideas, or the things them- selves. ]
§ 3. Ph. The mind is passive as regards its simple ideas; but the combinations it makes of them to form complex ideas, where many simple ideas are comprised under one and the same name, have somewhat of the volitional element ; for one man admits into the complex ideas he has of gold or of justice simple ideas which another does not admit.
the animation style is a lot more refined and coherent than Mind Game, but i kinda miss the first film’s uncautious potpourri of visuals
Th. [The mind is, however, active in reference to simple ideas when it detaches them one from another to consider them separately, — an act which is voluntary as well as the combination of many ideas ; whether it is done to call atten- tion to a complex idea resulting therein, or whether it is the purpose to comprehend them under the name given to the combination. And the mind cannot be deceived therein pro- vided it does not unite incompatible ideas and provided this name is still virginal, so to speak, that is to say, a name to which some notion has not already been attached, which might cause confusion with that which is newly attached thereto, and make arise either impossible notions by joining together what cannot take place, or notions superfluous and containing some obreption,^ by joining ideas, one of which may and ought to be derived from the other by demonstration.]
§ 4. Ph. Mixed modes and relations having no other reality than that which they have in men's minds, all that is requisite to make these sorts of ideas real is the possibility of existence or of compatibility together.
Th. l_Relations have a reality dependent upon the mind 1 I.e. Concealment of the truth. — Tk.
like truths; bat not the mind of men, since there is a supreme intelligence which determines them all for all time. Mixed modes, which are distinct from relations, may be real acci- dents. But be they dependent or not dependent upon the mind, it suffices for the reality of their ideas that these modes be possible or, what is the same thing, distinctly intelligible. And for this result it is necessary that their ingredients be compossible, i.e. capable of existing together.]
§ 5. Ph. But the complex ideas of substances, as they are all formed in relation to things existing outside of us, and as representative of substances such as really exist, are real only so far as they are combinations of simple ideas really both united and coexisting in things coexisting without us. On the contrary those are chimerical ^ which are composed of such collections of simple ideas as have never been really united and found together in any substance ; like those which form a centaur, a body resembling gold, save in weight, and lighter than water, a body similar in relation to the senses, but endowed with perception, voluntary movement, etc.
Th. [If I take in this manner the terms real and chimeri- cal otherwise in relation to the ideas of the modes than in relation to those which form a substance, I do not see what common notion in each case you give to real or chimerical ideas ; for the modes are real to you when they are possible, and substances have real ideas with you only when they are existent. But in desiring to tally with existence, we can determine but little whether an idea is chimerical or not, because what is possible, although not found in our place or time, may have existed formerly or will perhaps some day exist, or may indeed be found already present in another world, or even in ours without our knowing it, like the idea which Democritus had of the Milky Way ^ which the telescopes have verified : so that it seems better to say that possible ideas only become chimerical when we attach to them without foundation the idea of effective existence, as those do who promise themselves the philosopher's stone or, as those
1 Locke has: "fantastical," Philos. Works, Vol. 1, p. 510 (Bohn's ed.). — Tk.
2 c/. Aristotle, Meteorologica. Bk. I., chap. 8, 345", 25: "The Milky Way is the light of certain stars." Zeller, Die Philos. d. Oriech., 3d ed., Vol. 1, p. 724, note 1 ; 5th ed., 1892, 1. 2 [Vol. 2] , p. 897, note 8. — Tb.
would do who should believe that there had been a nation of centaurs. Otherwise in not regulating ourselves by exist- ence we shall deviate unnecessarily from the received language, which does not allow us to say that he who speaks in winter of roses or pinks speaks of a chimera, unless he imagines he is able to find them in his garden, as the story is told of Albert the Great' or of some other pretended Magician.]
§ 1. Ph. Real ideas are complete when they represent per- fectly the originals whence the mind supposes them to be taken, which they represent, and to which it refers them. Incomplete ideas represent only a part of these originals. § 2. All our simple ideas are complete. The idea of white- ness or of sweetness, which is noticed in sugar, is complete, because it suflEices for this, — that it corresponds entirely to the powers that God has put into this body to produce these sensations.
the story was much more compelling, i really love the backdrop of asymmetrical warfare between theater terrorists and palantir club
Th. [I see, sir, that you call complete or incomplete ideas those which your favorite author calls idem adwquatce ant inadcequatce ; you might call them perfect or imperfect. I have sometimes defined idea adcequata (a perfect idea) as that which is so distinct that all its ingredients are distinct, and such is nearly the idea of a number. But when an idea is distinct and contains the definition or the reciprocal marks of the object, it may be inadoiquata or imperfect, viz. ; when
i Albcrtus Magnus, 1193-1280. Schaarsclimidt states that " like many other scholars ol those dark centuries (Michael Seotus, Roger Bacon, etc.) he was susxjected of Magic," and adds that " Trithemius in jjarticular, who, moreover, takes the philosopher into his protection, gives an account thereof in his An- nales Hirsaugienses, Vol. 2, p. 40. Naud^ in his Apologie des Grands Hommes Soup<;onnis de Magie, chap. 18, Bayle in his Dictionary , see under Albert Le Grand, and Brucker, Hist. Philosophix, 3, 793 sq., have lil^ewise defended him." On his life and philosophy, cf. Erdmann, Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philos. §§ 199-202, Vol. 1, pp. 356 sq., and English translation of same; also Stijckl, Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittclalters, Vol. 2, pp. 352 sq., §§ 101-119.— Tr.
2 Locke's title ; the French might he rendered " complete and incomplete," as in the text. — Tr.
these marks or these ingredients are not also all distinctly known; for example, gold is a metal which resists the cupel and aqua fortis ; it is a distinct idea, for it gives the marks or the definition of gold; but it is not perfect for the nature of cupellation and the working of aqua fortis is not sufficiently known to us. Whence it comes that, when there is only an imperfect idea, the same subject is susceptible of many defini- tions independent the one of the other, so that we cannot always derive one from the other nor see beforehand that they must belong to one and the same subject, and then experience alone teaches us that they all belong to it at once. Thus gold may still be defined as the heaviest of our bodies, or the most malleable, without speaking of other definitions which might be invented. But we shall be able to see why it belongs to the heaviest of metals to resist these two tests of the assay- ers only when men shall have penetrated farther into the nature of things ; whilst in geometry, where we have perfect ideas, the case is different, for we can prove that the sec- tions of the cone and of the cylinder, made by a plane, are the same, viz. ellipses, and this cannot be unknown to us, if we take notice of it, because the notions we have of them are perfect. "With me the division of ideas into perfect and im- perfect is only a sub-division of distinct ideas, and it appears to me that only the confused ideas, like that we have of sweet- ness, of which you, sir, speak, deserve this name ; for although they express the power which produces the sensation, they do not express it wholly, or at least we cannot know this, for if we comprehended what is in this idea of sweetness we have we could judge whether it is sufficient as a rational expression of all that experience causes us to notice therein.]
§ 3. Fh. From simple ideas let us come to the complex; they are either of modes or of substances. Those of modes are the voluntary collections of simple ideas which the mind puts together ivitliout regard to certain archetypes or real and actually existing models ; they are complete and cannot be otherwise, because not being copies but archetj^pes, which the mmd forms in order to avail itself of them in ranking things under^ certain denominations, they can lack nothing, because each includes such a combination of ideas as the mind has desired to, form, and consequently such perfection as it had
planned to give thereto, and we cannot conceive that the understanding of any one can have a more comijlete or more perfect idea of a triangle than that of a figure of three sides and three angles. He who put together the ideas of danger, of execution, of the trouble that fear produces, of a calm con- sideration of what it would be reasonable to do, and of an actual application to its execution without being frightened by the danger, formed the idea of cow-age, and had what he desired, viz. : a complete idea conformed to his good pleasure. It is otherwise in our ideas of substances in which we main- tain that which really exists.
Th. [The idea of triangle or of courage has its archetype in the possibility of things as well as the idea of gold. And it is a matter of indifference, so far as the nature of the idea is concerned, whether it was invented in advance of experi- ence, or whether it was retained after the perception of a combination which nature had made. Combination also, which produces the modes, is not wholly voluntary or arbi- trary, for we can put together what is incompatible, as those do who invent machines for perpetual motion, while others can invent those which are good and practicable which have no other archetypes with us than the idea of the inventor which has as its archetype the possibility of things or the divine idea. Now these machines are substances. We can also invent impossible modes, as when we maintain the parallelism of parabolas, by imagining that we can find two parabolas parallel to each other, like two straight lines or two circles. An idea, then, whether it be that of a mode, or that of a substance, may be complete or incomplete according as we understand well or ill the partial ideas which form the total idea : and it is a mark of a perfect idea when it makes known perfectly the possibility of the object.]
§ 1. Ph. As truth ^ or falsehood belongs only to proposi- tions,'' it follows that when ideas are termed true or false there is some tacit proposition or affirmation; § 3. or a tacit assumption of their conformity to something, § 6. above all with, what others designate by this name (as when they speak of justice) item to what really exists (as man exists but not the centaur) item to the essence, upon which depend the prop- erties of the thing ; and in this sense our ordinary ideas of substances are false when we think of certain substantial forms. Besides, ideas deserve rather to be called accurate or faulty, than true or false.
Til. I believe that true or false ideas might be so under- stood, but as these different senses do not agree between them- selves and cannot be conveniently ranked under a common notion, I prefer to call the ideas true or false in relation to another tacit affirmation which they all include, which is that of possibility. Thus possible ideas are true, impossible false.']
§ 1. Ph. We often notice something odd in the reasonings of people, and everybody is subject to this. § 2. It is not alone obstinacy or self-love ; for often people who are well disposed are guilty of this fault. It does not indeed suffice to
WE’VE BEEN REDUCED TO NOTHING BUT A PERPETUAL GROUNDWORK-LAYING MACHINE! HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?
2 Of. Aristotle De Anima, III. 6,430", 27, and E. Wallace, Aristotle's Psychol- ogy in Greek and English, with Introduction and Notes, pp. 160, 161, Cam- IJridge: University Press, 1882; also De Interpret. 1, 16», 12, and E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philos. of Aristotle, 3d ed., § 11, p. 27. For Leibnitz, the true IS the thinkable, i.e. that which is free from contradiction in itself and of other truth. Thought-necessity is his criterion of possibility and of truth. —
attribute it to education and to prejudice. § 4. It is rather a kind of madness, and we should be foolish if we should always act thus. § 5. This fault arises from a non-natural connection of ideas, which has its origin in chance or custom. § 6. Inclination and interest enter into it. Certain tracts of the repeated course of animal spirits become beaten roads; when we know ^ a certain air, we find it as soon as we begin it. § 7. Thence arise the sympathies or antipathies which are not born with us. A child has eaten too much honey and has been surfeited by it, and then having become a full-grown man, he cannot hear the name honey without a rising of the stomach. § 8. Children are very susceptible to these impres- sions, and it is well to be careful of them. § 9. This irregu- lar association of ideas has a great influence in all our actions and passions natural and moral. § 10. Darkness revives the idea of ghosts in children because of the stories told them about them. § 11. You do not think of a man whom you hate without thinking of the evil he has done or may do. § 12. You shun the room in which you have seen a friend die. § 13. A mother who has lost a very dear child sometimes loses with it all her joy, until time effaces the impression of this idea, which sometimes never ^ happens. § 14. A man perfectly cured of madness by an extremely painful operation acknowledged all his life his obligation to the one who per- formed this operation ; but it was impossible for him to endure the sight of the operator. § 15. Some hate books all their life because of the bad treatment they received in school. Some one having once gotten the upper hand of another upon some occasion keeps it always. § 16. A man was found who had learned to dance finely, but could not execute the dance unless there was in the room a trunk like the one which had been in the room where he had learned. § 17. The same non-natural bond is found in the intellectual habits ; you bind matter to being, as if there were nothing immaterial. § 18. The sectarian party in philosophy, religion, and the state is attached to its opinions.
Th. [This remark is important and wholly to my taste, and can be fortified by an infinite number of examples. Descartes
1 Gerhardt reads: " sait " ; Erdmann and Jacques: "suit," follow. — Tr.
2 Gerhardt reads : "jamais"; Erdmann and Jacques : "pas." — Tr.
having had in his youth some affection for a squint-eyed per- son could not prevent himself from having all his life an incli- nation towards those who had this defect. Hobbes, another great philosopher, could not (they say) remain alone in a dark place, without having his mind frightened by images of ghosts, although he did not believe in them, this impression having remained from the stories told to children. Many persons well informed and sensible, and who are decidedly superior to -superstition, cannot bring themselves to be thir- teen at a repast without being extremely disconcerted, having sometime been impressed by the fancy that one of them must die during the year. There was a gentleman who, having been injured, perhaps in his infancy, by a badly fastened pin, could not see one in this condition without being ready to fall into a swoon. A prime minister, who bore in the court of his master the name of President, was offended by the title of the book of Ottavio Pisani, called Lycurgus, and wrote against this book, because the author, in speaking of the officers of justice whom he thought superfluous, had named also the Presidents, and although this term in the person of this minister meant a totally diflierent thing, he had so attached the word to his person that he was wounded in this word. And this is a case of the most usual of the non-natural associations, capable of misleading, as those of words to things, when indeed there is any ambiguity. In order the better to understand the source of the non-natural bond of ideas, you must consider what I have already said above (Chap. 11, § 11 0; ^^ speaking of the reasonings of animals, that man as well as the animal is inclined to put together in his memory and imagination what he has observed united in his perceptions and experience. It is in this that all the reasoning, if so it may be called, of animals consists, and often that of men, so far as they are empirical and govern themselves only by the senses and examples, without examining whether the same reason still has force. And as often the reasons are unknown to us, we must have regard to the examples in proportion to their frequency, for then the expectation or the reminiscence of one perception
1 Cf. ante, p. 145. Gerhardt has § 1 ; Erdmann and Jacques § 11 ; the latter reference is the correct one, and has therefore been placed in the text of t)ie translation. — Tr.
on the occasion' of another perception which is ordinarily connected therewith is reasonable; particularly when the question is about taking precautions. But as the vehemence of a very strong impression often produces as much eiiect at once as the frequency and repetition of manj^ moderate impressions would be able to make in a long time, it happens that this vehemence engraves upon the fancy an image as profound and as vivid as long experience.^ Whence it comes that a chance but violent impression unites in our imagination and memory two ideas, at that time together there,^ altogether as strongly and durably and gives us the same inclination to connect them and to attend to them one after the other, as if a long usage had verified the connection ; thus the same result of association is found, although the same reason does not exist. Authority, party,* custom, produce also the same effect as experience and reason, and it is not easy to deliver one's self from these inclinations. But it would not be very difficult to keep one's self from being deceived in these judg- ments, if men would attach themselves seriously enough to the search for truth, or proceed methodically, when they recognize that it is important to them to find it.]
1 Gerhardt reads: " d'uue perception a I'occasioii," which Erdmann and Jacques omit. — Tr.
2 Erdmann and Jacques add: " auroit pu le faire," could have done. — Tr. 2 Gerhardt reads: " qui y estoient ensemble alors, tout aussi fortement et
it’s just such a good way of putting it; it’s so relatable. definitely some good criticism of male gaze etc… came up as minfeub discussed this film, but i think that this isn’t fully satisfying to me. i think Yuasa is interested in at least a little in psychosexual pathologies, so i think it would be wrong to leave out guys being pushy. we have a nice foil to the main guy in don underwear, but the guy who gropes the main girl is much closer to the main guy than don underwear: all neurotic and life denying. i think it’s quite common to depict shitty men as like entitled airheads, it’s just a quality i appreciated in the film. we stan don underwear…
durablement; et nous donne," etc. Erdmann and Jacques, " qui dej^ y e'taient ensemble, et nous donne," etc. — Tr.
§ 1. Ph. God having made man to be a social being, has not only inspired him with the desire, and placed him under the necessity of living with those of his species, but has given him also the faculty of speech which is to be the great instru- ment and common bond of this society. Hence it is that words arise, which serve to represent and also to explain ideas.
Til. [I rejoice to see that you are averse to the view of Hobbes,^ who did not admit that man was made for society,
1 Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679, in his De Cive, 1642, and Leviathan, 1651, maintained that man, being by nature a selfish and solitary animal, had no natural impulse lor society, and that social union sprang simply from lear and from motiyes ol gain, the natural condition being that of universal war. Leibnitz maintains, in agreement with Aristotle and Hugo Grotius, 1583-1645, that Nature herself has destined man for society in order not only that he may the better and more easily realize his highest being, but that he may realize it at all, such realization being impossible in isolation and solitude.
Cf. Aristotle, Polit, I., 2, 1253*, 2: ort riiiv ^vaet ij n-oAi? etrTt, Kal on avdpojTTO^ c/iuo'ei TToKiTiicov Cv°y; HI,, 6^ 1278'', 19: 0i/(ret fjiey ktniv avOptinro^ ^uov iroAiTiKOC, 5ib Kal ^vjoec Seofievoi ttj? Trap* aAAjjAwi' ^orjdeias oiiK eXaTTOy opeyovrat tov tTv^rjv^ English trans- lation by B. Jowett, Vol. 1, pp. 4, 78, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1885; also Eth.
NlC. IX., 9, 1169'', 3 Sq., espec. 16-19: aron-ov 5* to-tu? tal t6 p.ovbiTT]v noielv TOf fianapiov • ovdeXs yap eAoiT* av Ka9' avTov Ta iracT* exeti/ ayada • TroAiTLKOC yap o tti/flpwTro?
KoX oufV irerf>v,<05, 1., 1, 1094", 6 sq., English translation by F. H. Peters, pp. .'i07 «?-, 3 ; cf. also Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., II., 2 [Vol. 4], pp. 680, 063, 3d ed., 1879. Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pads, 1625, Preliminary Discourse, § 6: " Amongst the things peculiar to man, is his desire ol society, that is, a certain inclination to live with those of bis own kind, not in any manner whatever, but peace-
conceiving that he has been forced into it by necessity and by the wickedness of tliose of his species. But he did not con- sider that the best men, free from all wickedness, united them- selves the better to obtain their purposes, as the birds flock together the better to travel in company, and the beavers unite in large numbers to make great dams, in which work a small number of these animals could not succeed ; and these dams are necessary to them, to provide reservoirs of water or little lakes, in which they build their huts and catch the fish upon which they feed. This then is the foundation of the society of the animals which are adapted to it, and nowise the fear of their kind, which is rarely found among animals.]
Ph. Very true, and it is the better to cultivate this society that man by nature has his organs so fashioned that they are adapted to the formation of the articulate sounds which we call tvords.
Th. [As for organs, monkeys have them apparently as suit- able as ours for the formation of words, but they do not take the least step in this direction.^ Thus it must be that they >-■ lack an invisible something. We must also consider that we
but its true you can read the story as a bit misogynistic if you overgeneralize: i don’t think the solution to incels or whatever is that they need a manic pixie walk girl to show them attention. that aspect of the story is where i would direct any criticism, or at the very least, a bit more thought into how the film could come to an end
ably, and ia a eommimity regulated according to the best of his understand- ing, which disposition the Stoicks termed olKeiojo-is " ; quoted from English translation with " all the large notes of Mr. J. Barbeyrac," etc., London: Printed for W. Innys and E. Manby, and others, 17.38. A French translation by Jean Barbeyrac, professor of law at Groningen, "with the author's notes which had not yet appeared in French, and new notes by the translator,"
2 vols., 4to, Amsterdam, 1724; a later translation into English by Whewell,
3 vols., 8vo, Cambridge, 1853 ; a German translation in J. H. v. Kirchmann's Philos. Bibliothek, 3 vols., 12mo, Leipzig, 1879.
In the formation of society, language — Aoyos, rational speech — plays an important part, serving as a special means of communication between men. Of. Aristotle, rolit. I., 2-18, 1253'> ; Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pads, Prehm. Disc. § 7 : "A man grown up . . . has besides an exquisite desire of society, for the satisfaction of which he alone of all animals has received from nature a peculiar instrument, viz. the use of speech." — Tr.
1 Schaarschmidt states that "this earlier generally diffused view, that the apes had organs of speech — an opinion still at the present day firmly held by the negroes — has already been refuted by Peter Camper," 1722-1789, a dis- tinguished Dutch anatomist and naturalist, in his Natuurkundige Verhandr elinc/en over den Oranr/-Outanr/ an eetilr/e andere Aapsoorten ; cf. p. 147 sq., of the German translation by J. F. M. Herbell. Diisseldorf, 1791, 4to. The most important of Camper's works bearing on comparative anatomy, trans- lated into French by H. C. Jansen, were published in (Eiirres de P. Camper qui ont pour objet I'hisloire naturelle, laphi/siologie, et I'anatomle eomparie. Paris, 1803, 3 vols., 8vo. The piece referred to in this note is found in Vol. 1 of this ed. — Tr.
could speak, i.e. make ourselves understood by the sounds of the mouth without forming articulate sounds, if we availed ourselves of musical tones for this effect ; but more art would be necessary to invent a language of tones, whilst that of words may have been formed and perfected gradually by per- sons who found themselves in a state of natural simplicity. There are, however, people like the Chinese, who by means of tones and accents vary their words, of which they have only a smalL number. Thus it was the opinion of Golius,' a cele- brated mathematician and great linguist, that their language_is_^ artificial, i.e. had been invented all at once by some clever man iiMirder to establish verbal intercourse between the large num- ber of different nations inhabiting this great country which ■we_oall China, although this language may now be found altered by long use.]
§ 2. Ph. [As orang-outangs and other monkeys have organs without forming words, we can say that parrots and some other birds have words without language], for we can train these birds and many others to form sounds quite distinct ; but they are nowise capable of language. Man only is in a condition to avail himself of these sounds as signs of internal conceptions, in order that thereby they may be manifested to others.
Th. [I believe in fact that apart from the desire of making ourselves understood we should never have formed language ; ^ but being formed, it further serves man in reasoning within himself, both by the means words give him of remembering his abstract thoughts, and the benefit he finds in availing him- self in reasoning of characters and surd thoughts ; for he would require too much time, if he were obliged to explain everything and always to substitute definitions in the place of terms.]
§ 3. Ph. But as the multiplication of words would produce
1 Jacob Gobi — Latin, Golius — 1596-1667, an eminent Dutch orientalist, who distinguisbed bimseU at Leyden University in classics, matliematics, and pliilosopby, was a pupil of Erpenius in Arabic, and in 1624 succeeded him as professor of Arabic at Leyden. In 1629 be returned from Asia Minor and the East, where he bad spent four years, bringing with him a large and valuable collection of Mss. which he placed in the library of the university. His prin- cipal work, still to-day esteemed, is the Lexicon Arabico-Latinam, 1653, folio.— Tr.
but the final few sequences were sooooo good animation-wise. i love her curing his fever, it’s so expressionistic, and then how quickly everything turns back to normal as it becomes day. the difference is night and day…
confusion in their use, if a distinct term were necessary to designate each particular thing, language has been further perfected by the use of general terms when they signify general ideas.
Th. [General terms serve not only for the perfection of languages, but they are necessary even to their essential constitution. For if by particular things we mean individual things, it would be impossible to speak if there were only proper names and not appellatives, i.e. if there were words only for the individuals, since at every moment something now presents itself (to the mind) when individuals, accidents, and particularly acts, which are most frequently designated, are in question. Biit if by particular things we understand the lowest species (species injimoe), besides the fact that it is difficult very often to determine them, it is manifest that they are already universals formed upon similitude. Then as the question is only of a similitude more or less extended, accord- ing as we speak of genera or species, it is natural to indicate every sort of similitude or agreement and consequently to ' employ general terms of all degrees ; and indeed the most general being less burdened with relation to the ideas or essences they include, although they are more comprehensive in relation to the individuals to which they apply, were very often the easiest to form and are the most useful. Thus yon see that children and those who know only little of the lan- guage which they wish to speak, or of the matter of which they speak, avail themselves of general terms as thing, plant, animal, instead of employing the proper terms which they lack. And it is certain that all proper or individual names were originally app)ellative or general.']
1 Leibnitz seems liere to be in error in deciding from a logical or meta- physical point of view that language originated in or proceeded from general terms and relations rather than in those which are individual. In the order of experience the individnal thing or relation is first, and first receives its name eitlier wholly arbitrarily or by convention, or by this in combination with natural imitation or suggestion ; the generalizing process and its result, the general name or term, comes afterwards. Children, it is true, use terms of general import, but with no consciousness that they are general. Every- I tiling is for them individual, particular, separate and by itself until continued j observation and increasing knowledge enable them to detect similarities and I differences and to classify and generalize accordingly. Then only do they, strictly speaking, possess or use general terms. — Tk.
§ 4. Ph. There ate also words which men employ not to signify an idea, but the lack or absence of a certain idea, as nothing, ignorance, sterility.
Th. [I db not see why we could not say that there are privative ideas, as there are negative truths, for the act of denial is positive., I had already touched upon this.]
§ 5. Ph. Without disputing about this point, it will be more useful to approach a little nearer the origin of all our notions and knowledge, to observe how the words employed to form actions and notions wholly removed from the senses, derive their origin from sensible ideas, whence they are transferred to significations more abstruse.
Til. [The fact is our needs have compelled us to leave the natural order of ideas, for this order would be the same for angels, men, and all intelligences in general, and would have to be followed by us, if we had no regard for our interests. It has been necessary to attach thereto what the occasions and accidents to which our species is subject have furnished us ; and this order gives not the origin of the notions, but so to speak the history of our discoveries.^']
Ph. [Very true, and it is the analysis of words which may teach us by means of the names themselves this concatenation which that of the notions cannot give by means of the reason, which you have brought forward.] Thus the following words : imagine, comprehend, to attach, conceive, instil, disgust, trouble, tranquillity, etc., are all derived from the operations of sensible things and applied to certain modes of thought. The word spirit in its primary signification is breath,^ and angel signifies a messenger. Whence we can conjecture what kind of notions
1 "The natural order of ideas," according to Leibnitz, proceeds from the general to the particular, from the abstract to the concrete, while language shows that "we have advanced from sense-impressions to abstract ideas," and thus " expresses not the essence of our knowledge, but only the history of its development. In a still broader sense the history of language is the history of the development of the human spirit in general." — Tr.
2 Cf. the Hebrew nn (Spinoza, Trad. Theol. Polit., chap. 1, Opera, ed. Van Vloten and Land, Vol. 1, p. 384; English translation by Elwes, Vol. 1, p. 19) ; the Greek fveiiia from wvelv (Cremer, Bib. Theol. Lexicon of N. T. Greek, 2d English from 2d German ed., p. 504, Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1878, says that as " the element of life " ..." in a physiological sense, we often find it ('""•"'"'') in profane Greek, especially in the poets and in later Greek ; in a psychological sense, as the element of human existence and personal life, never") ■ and the Latin spiritus from spirare. — Tr.
i think the cold is a central thing to analyze, but i’m not really sure what it represents. my best guess is that a way i interpret my own tinnitus is that on the one hand it’s bad, suffering, disability, but on the other hand it’s sort of inextricable background radiation necessary precondition for being alive and having conscious experience. when she was talking with rihaku, that’s basically the vibe that i got, the disease he spread, his immense suffering and negative perspective on life that he felt while drinking the fake denki brandy, is bad but evidence that he lives in a society and is able to share his pain with others which is beautiful maybe. idk it’s late i didn’t write my review earlier so some details have started to slip from my mind…
they had who spoke these first languages and how nature will suggest unexpectedly to men the origin and the principle of all their knowledge by the terms themselves.
Th. [I have already remarked to you that in the credo of the Hottentots they called the Holy Spirit by a term which signifies among them a breath of air benign and sweet.' The same is true as regards the majority of other words, and indeed the fact is not always recognized because most frequently the true etymologies are lost. A certain Dutchman, with little regard for religion, abused this truth (that the terms theology, ethics, and metaphysics are taken originally from gross things) in order to ridicule theology and the Christian faith in a little Flemish dictionary, in which he gave to the terms definitions or explications not such as usage demands, but such as the original force of the words seemed to bear, and put upon them a malicious interpretation ; and as he elsewhere had given indications of impiety he is said to have been punished in the Raspel-huys? It will, however, be well to consider this analogy of sensible and non-sensible things which has served as the basis of tropes : a matter that you will understand the better by con- sidering a very extended example such as is furnished by the use oi prexjositions, like to, loith, from, before, in, without, by, for, upon, to'wards (fX, avec, de, devant, en, hors, par, pour, sur, vers), which are all derived from place, from distance, and from motion, and afterwards transferred to every sort of change, order, sequence, difference, agreement. To (A) signifies approach, as in the expression : I go to (A) Kome. But as in order to attach anything we bring it near that to which we wish to unite it, we say that one thing is attached to (d) another. And further, as there is, so to speak, an immaterial attachment, when one thing follows the other from moral reasons ; we say that what follows the movements and voli- tions of any one belongs to (d.) that person or adheres to him as if it gave signs to this person to go near it or with it. A
1 Of. Book I., chap. 3, § 8, Tli. The Apostle's Creed, the Ten Command- ments, and the Lord's Prayer in the Hottentot language, as sent to Leibnitz by N. Witseu, are given in Dutens, Leibnit. ojjera omnia, Vol. 6, Pt. 2, pp. 201-200. Schaarschmidt remarks that " this observation of both philosophers, that the meaning of words has proceeded and still proceeds from the concrete to the abstract, is the guide to sound etymology and word-explanation." — Ta.
body is with (avec) another when they are in the same place ; but they say also that a thing is with {avec) that which is found in the same time, in the same order, or part of an order, or which concurs in one and the same act. When we come from (de) any place, the place has been our object through the sensible things it has furnished us, and it is still in our memory, which is entirely filled with it; and thence it comes, that the object is signified by the preposition of (de) as in the expression, the question is of (de) that, they speak of {de) that, i.e. as if it arose from it. And as what is included in any place or in any whole is supported by and carried away with it, the accidents are in the same way considered as in {dans) the subject, sxmt in subjecto, inhmrent subjecto. The particle upon {sur) is also applied to the object; they say he is upon {sw) this matter, very much as a workman is iq^on {sur) the wood or upon {sur) the stone, that he cuts or forms; and as these analogies are extremely variable and do not de- pend on any determinate notions, it thence comes that languages vary much in the use of these particles and cases which the prepositions govern, or rather in which they are found as things understood and virtually included.]
§ 1. Ph. Now as words are employed by men as signs of their ideas, we may ask in the first place how their words have been determined ; and we find that it is not by any natural connection existing between certain articulate sounds and cer- tain ideas (for in this case there would be only one language among men), but by an arbitrary institution in virtue of which agiven word has been purposely made a sign of a given idea.^
1 For early discussions of the nature and origin of language, and tlie ques- tion whether words were given hy nature or convention, cf. Plato, Crnli/liis, English translation by B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 2d ed., 1875, Vol. 2, p. 203 sq. ; 3d ed., 1892, Vol. 1, p. 323 sq., New York : Macmillan & Co. ; Aristo- tle, De Interpret., 2, 16«, 19 sq.; E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philos. of Aris- totle, 3d ed., § 11, p.27. For modern discussions, cf. W. D. Whitney, Language
Th. [I know it has been customary to say in tlie schools and almost everywhere else that the meanings of words are arbitrary {ex instituto) and it is true that they are not deter- mined by a natural necessity, but they are nevertheless determined by reasons sometimes natural, in which chance has some share, sometimes moral, where choice enters. There are perhaps some artificial languages which are wholly of choice and entirely arbitrary, as that of China is believed to have been, or as those of George Dalgarno ^ and the late Mr. Wil- kins,' bishop of Chester. But those which are known to have been coined from languages already known, are from elioice mixed with what there is of nature and chance in the lan- guages they suppose. Thus it is in the case of those languages which thieves have coined in order to be understood only by those of their gang, which the Germans call Eothwelsch^' the
and the Sludi/ of Langiuu/e, Lect. XI., p. 395 sq., 4th ed., Now York, ISfill; B. Jowett, in his Introduction to Plato's Cratyltis, op. cH., 2d cd., Vol. 2, p. 189 sq. ; 3d ed.. Vol. 1, p. 2H1 sq. ; H. Steintlial, Einleitunr/ in die I'.tijrlwhHjie unil Spritcluoiasensivluifl ; Hi'rni. Paul, I'rincipien der iSprachgexchicIilc, Hallo, 1880; B. Delbriick, Eiiileitiini/ in das Si:)rachstudivm, Leipsic, 1880, 2d ed., 1884. Loihiiitz rif;lilly points out that both nature and freedom of choice share in the formation of language. " Nature furnishes to a certain extent the material which the mind in its progressive self-absorption shapes withiu certain limits arbitrarily; and every human individual in the use of the language already formed is himself still so situated as to be able up to a certain point freely to appropriate and use that which is given." — Tr.
1 George Dalgarno, c. l(i2()-l(;,S7, published at Loudon in 1661, his Ars sig- norum, vuh/o character iiniversalis et lingna philosophica. Qua potervnt, homines dlrersixsimorum idiomatum, sputio duarum se}ili)nana.rum, omnia animi sna sensa (in rebas fa)niliarihvs) 7ion minus intellif/ibililer, sive scri- bendo, sive loquendo, m.ntno communieare, quam Unguis propiis vernaculis, from which Bishop John Wilkins, 1614-1672, derived the idea of his Essay toxoards a real character and a philosophical langnnijc with an alphabetical dictionary. London, 16(;8. For Leibnitz's plan of a General Characteristic (Gharacterisiica Universalis — Spdcieuse gdncrale) and the extent to which he followed Dalgarno and Wilkins, cf. Trendelenburg's paper: Ueber Leibni- zens En.tuMtrf einer allgemeincn CharakteristiJc, in his Ilistorisrhe Beitriige zur Fhilos., Vol. 3, p. 1 sq., Berlin, 1867 ; cf. also Gerhardt, Die philos. Schrift. v.G. W. Leibniz, Vol. 7,p.3s(/.,' Vol. 3, p. 210; Dniens, Leibnit. opera omnia, Vol. 6, p. 2(;2. Dalgarno is credited with the invention of the first manual alphabet. His works were reprinted at Edinburgh, ISM, 4to. — Tr.
2 Cf. Ave Lallemant, nas deutsche (launerthum, 4 vols., Leipzig, 1858-1862, in which, says Sc.haarschmidt, " the so-called Rothwiilseh, the artificial lan- guage of thieves in Germany, prominent already in the sixteenth and more so in the seventeenth century, is treated with especial thoroughness of detail. In this work it is shown that the Hebrew especially has contributed to the Gaunersprache a strong word-contingent, while its grammar ia conformed to
i like this film
Italians Lingua Zerga,^ the French Narquois, but wliioh they usually form upon (the basis of) the languages commonly known to them, either by changing the received significations of the words by means of metaphors, or by making new words by means of a composition or derivation in their own fashion. Languages are also formed through the intercourse of different peoples, either by mingling indifferently neighboring lan- guages, or as most frequently happens, by taking the one as a base which is mutilated and altered, mixed and corrui)ted by neglecting and changing that which it observes, and even by grafting thereupon new words. Thi' Lingua Frcuica, which is used in the commerce of the INIediterranean, is made from the Italian, and no regard is paid to the rules of grammar. An Armenian Dominican, with whom I conversed at Paris, had himself made, or perhaps learned from his fellows, a kind of Lingua Fnumi, made from Latin, which I found intelligible enough, although it had neither case, nor tense, nor other inflections, and he spoke it with ease, being accustomed to it. Father Labb6,^ a French Jesuit, very learned, known by many other works, has made a language of which Latin is the base, which is easier and has less constraint than our Latin, but which is more regular than the Lingua Franca. He has made a book expressly of it. As for the languages which are found made a long time ago, there are but few which are not greatly
the German. In Italy the Oavvnrsprache bears the name Gergo, which corre- sponds to the French Argot. To what extent in Leibnitz's time attention was directed to the Rothwiilsch the romance literature shows ; bnt especially the Gesichte PhilandKrs von Sittewald," a remarkable work, in which, under the name ol Philander von Sittenwald, the author, Joh. Mich. Moscherosch, lOOO- 1669, a German litterateur, whose true name was Kalbkopf, has given a series ol satirical pictures o£ the caprices and tlie vices of society in his time, and which placed him among the beet prose writers of his century. It was pub- hshed at Strasburg, 1C44-1C50, 2 vols., 8vo. — Tk.
2 Philip Labb^, 1()07-1607, a learned French chronologer, a man of vast memory, astonishing erudition, and great mental activity; a voluminous writer, and though gentle in personal character, a fierce and abusive contro- versialist. Leibnitz mentions him in a letter, July 15, 1709, to Geheimrath voiillgen; cf, Gerliardt, Leibniz, philos. Schrift.,!, 31): " noch des P. Labbe (der die Lateinische mittelst einiger Veranderungen zur allgemeinen Sprach machen wollen)." Ho was the author of CunrDi-ilin chroiwlnr/jra, technica et hisiorioa, 165C; but in chiefly known to-day by his work ou Latin pronuncia- tion, Eruditm pronuntiritionis catholici indices, enlarged by E. Leeds, and republished in London, 1751. —Tri.
altered to-day. This is evident by comparing them with their ancient books and monuments which remain. The old French approached nearer the Proven9al and the Italian, and we see the Theotisque^ with the French or Eomance rather (some- times called Lingua Romana rustica) as they were in the ninth century after Jesus Christ in the forms of the oaths of the sons of the Emperor Louis le Debonnaire, which Nithard, their kinsman, has preserved for us.^ We find little elsewhere of so old French, Italian, or Spanish. But for the Theotisque, or ancient German, there is the gospel of Otfried,^ a monk of
2 For tlie text of these famous oaths, taken at Strashurg, Feb. 14, 842, cf, Nithard, c. T'JO-c. 858, Hist., written, at the command of Charles the Bald, between 841 and 843, Bk. III., chap. 5, pp. 38, 39, ed. Pertz, and Pertz, Monu- menta GennaniiB Hintorica, Vol. 2, pp. 665, 666, where they are preserved in the old Romance — lingua Romana rvstica — and old German — Imc/iia Teotisca — languages. 6/. also Dutens, Leibnitii opera omnia, Vol. 6, Pt. 11., pp. 141- 144, where " ntramque formulam (' jurarunt Ludovicus Romane, Carolus Tentonicfe ') eodem signiiicatu, conceptis verbis ex JVithai'do exhibebimus interlineariter colligatam, quia sibi verbotenus respondent, et ipso parallehsmo illustrantur." The best edition for the study of the old German part of the oaths is in Karl Miillenhoff n. Wilhelm Scherer, Denlcniiiler dentscher Poesie u. Prosa aus VIU-XII Jahrh., Denkm. No. 67, 2 Ansg. Berlin, 1873; 3 Aufl. bearbeitet v. E. Steinmeyer. Vol. 2 contains notes summing up the best results of critical study. Explanations of the old German text have also been made by J. Grimm, 1785-1863, in his Eleinere Schrifien, Vol. 6, pp. 403 sq., see also Monumenta Germanix Historica, Vol. 2, pp. 465 sq. ; and by H. F. Massmann, 1797-1874, in his Die Icleinen Sprachdenkmale des YIII bis XII Jahrh. Quedlinburg u. Leipzig, 1839. Fr. Ch. Diez, 1794-1876, "the real founder ol Scientific Romance philology and linguistics," in his Altromanische Sprachdenkmiiler, Bonn, 1846, has explained the Romance portion of the text, and gives, op. cit. pp. 3-5, a, good portion of the literature on this interesting linguistic monument. The best textual notes on the Romance or old French part of the oaths are in W. Foerster u. E. Kosohwitz, Altfranzusisches Uebungs- buck, Heilbronn, 1884; while the best facsimile of the whole fragment, both French and German, is the Album of the Socie'te' des anciens textes franfais (Lcs phis anciens monuments de la langue /ran<;aise), 'Pa.vis, 1875. The old Romance text, the earliest specimen of French in existence, with a modern French translation, is found in Brachet, A Historical Grammar of the French Tongue, (ith English, from 20th French ed., pp. 17, 18, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884 ; while to these a Latin version is added for comparison in tlie article on the "Latin Language" propefl.n.,m the Encyclop. Srif., 9th ed., Vol. 14, pp. 340, .341 (American Reprint). — Tr.
3 The gospel of Otfrid, usually called the Life of Christ, was written in the Soutli-Frankish dialect of the Old High German in 867 or 868, and dedicated to King Louis the German. Editions of it were published by Matthias Flaeius lUyricus, 1520-1575, at Basle in 1571, 8vo, "a book as curious as rare," and by Schilter-Scherz in the Thesaurus antiquitatum teutonicum, Vol. 1. Ulmfe, 1727-1728, 3 vols., f ol. These have now no critical worth, but merely an historical
Weissenburg of this same time, which Flacius has published and which Schilter^ wished to edit anew. Tlie iSaxons who passed into Great Britain have left us books still more ancient. They have a version or paraphrase of the beginning of Genesis and of some other parts of the Sacred History, made by a Csedmon whom Bede already mentions.'^ But the most ancient book, not only of the Germanic languages, but of all the lan- guages of Europe, except Greek and Latin, is that of the gospel of the Goths of the Pontus Euxinus, known by the name of Codex Argenteus,^ written in characters entirely pecu-
interest and value. Cf. H. Paul, Grundriss d. c/erm. Philolof/ie, II, 214, Stras- burg, 1889—. It has also been edited by E. Th. Graff, Kijnigsberg, 1831, 4to, an edition good in its day, but now antiquated ; and more recently by J. Kelle, with grammar and glossary in 3 vols., Regensburg, 1856-1881; by P. Piper, Paderborn, 1878, containing the fullest critical apparatus ; and by Erdmann, Halle, 1882, the most convenient. Piper has also published a student's edition, Freiburg, 1884; and Kelle a translation, Chrisli Leben vnd Lehre besuni/en von Otfrid, Prag. 1870. Cf. also W. Scherer, Gesch. d. deutschen Lit. 6th ed., pp. 48-51, Berlin, 1891; Eng. trans., Irom 3d Germ, ed.. Vol. 1, pp. 44-46, New York, Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1886. To Otfrid is due, for the most part, the introduction into German poetry, in place of the earlier alliterative metre, of the rhymed stanza imitated from that of the Latin Church hymns. — Tk.
1 John Schilter, 1632-1705, a distinguished German jurisconsult and archse- ologist. Professor of Law at Strasburg, and author of the work referred to in note 3, Thesaurus aiitiquitatum teutonicum, which was edited, after Schilter's death, by Job. Geor. Seberz, and is filled with documents of great value for the civil and literary history of Germany at the time of the Carlovingians. Schilter was led to linguistic studies through his legal and antiquarian investi- gations. Cf. Dutens, Leibnit. opera omnia, 6, Pt. II., p. 222, where Leibnitz remarks: "I am told that Mr. Schilter, of Strasburg, is none too well, and as he is an old man, I fear that his edition of Notger and Otfried will not appear. . . . Mr. Schilter makes use, moreover, of the Gothic Gospels of Ulfilas, of the Anglo-Saxon , and also of the Icelandic, as well as of other old books and glossaries ; for we must unite the different dialects of all the Teu- tonic peoples in order to explain the old books." — Tr.
2 On Csedmon, died 680, (f. Bede, Eccles. Hist., Bk. IV., chap. 24, pp. 217- 220, 5th ed. (Bohn's Lib.), London : Geo. Bell and Sons, 1884 ; H. Morley, En<i- lish Writers, Bk. IL, chap. 4, Vol, 2, p. 71 .s^., London: CasseU and Co., 1888; B. Ten Brink, Early Eng. Lit., trans, by H. M. Kennedy, pp. 39^8 and .371- 386, New York : Henry Holt & Co., 1884 ; S. A. Brooke, Hist of Early E„r/. Lit., pp. 275-340, New York: Maomillau & Co., 1892. For the text of the poem.s ascribed to him, cf. Benj. Thorpe, Csedmon's Metrical Paraphrase of Fart of the Holy Scripture in Anglo-Saxon ; with an Eng. Trans., Notes, and a Verbal Index, London: 1832; 0. W. M. Grein, Bibliothek der Angel-Siichsischen Poesie, 1857, Vol. 1; new ed. by R. Wulker, Vols. 1-3, 1883-1889, still in prog- ress; the vol. containing Csedmon has not yet (1892) appeared; T. W. Hunt, Cxdmon's Exodus and Daniel, Boston : Ginn & Co.', 4th ed., 1889. — Tr.
-rachel
'The Codex Argenteus — Silver Codex — so called because written in silver and gold letters upon purple-stained vellum and bound in silver, as was the
liar, which was found in the ancient monastery of the Benedic- tines of Werden in Westphalia, and has been carried into Sweden, where it is preserved, as with reason it should be, with as much care as the original of the Pandects in Florence, although this version was made by the Eastern Goths and in a dialect far removed from the Scandinavian German; but it is because they believe, with some probability, that the Goths of the Pontus Euxinus came originally from Scandinavia, or at least from the Baltic Sea. Now the language or the dialect of these ancient Goths is very different from the modern German, although it has the same linguistic basis. The ancient Gallic was still more different, to judge by the lan- guage most nearly approaching the true Gallic, which is that of the country of Wales, Cornwall, and Basse-Bretagne ; hut the Irish differs therefrom still more and shows us traces of a Britannic, Gallic, and Germanic language, still more ancient. But all these languages come from one source, and may be
case with costly Mss. in those days, originally consisted of 330 leaves con- taining the Gospels in the following order: Matt., John, Luke, Marie, trans- lated into the Gothic language, ahout the middle of the fourth century, by Bishop Ulfilas (Vulfila), 311-383. Only 177 leaves now remain. Gf. F. L. Stamni, Ulfilas, 1S72, new ed. by M. Heyne, Paderhorn, 1885, Einleitung, p. ix. The Ms., like all existing Gothic Mss., seems to have been written in Italy during the rule of the East Goths in the first half of tlie sixth century, and, after many adventures, was at last carried in 1669 to Upsala, where it now is. It is one of the few sources of our knowledge of Gothic, and, as Ulfilas was a fine scholar, and made his translation of the New Testament from tlie Greek original, with frequent comparison of the Latin versions, it is of some value in New Testament textual criticism. Editions of Ulfilas may he named as follows: The two earlier, by H. C. v. d. Gabelentz and J. Loebe, 3 vols., Altenburg u. Leipzig, 1843-18iU, and H. F. Massmann, Stuttgart, 1855-1856, 2 vols. 8vo, rest upon still older single editions with many faults. Cf. I-I. Paul, Grundriss d. germ. Philolor/ie, II, 69, Anm. 2. The critical editions of A. Uppstrom : Codex Argenteus, Upsala, 1854-1855 ; Decern codicis arg. rediviva folia, ih. 1857; Fragmenta yothica selecta, ib. 1861; Codices goihici Ambrosiani, Stockh. u. Leipzig, 1864-1868, in whose work for the first time was laid an entirely secure foundation for Gothic text-criticism, and upon whom the later editions rest. Of. H. Paul, op. cit.i and Stamm-Heyne, Ulfilas, Einl. p. xi. Tlie larger ed. of E. Bernhardt, Vulfila, Oder die gotische Bihcl, Halle, 1875, is tlie best tor comparison with the Greek ; while his smaller ed., Die gotische Bihel des Vulfila, Halle, 1884, and that of Stamm-Heyne cited above are the most convenient. The best introduction to Gothic in English is J. Wright, A Primer of Gothic, London and New York, Macmillan & Co., 1892. Cf. also W. Scherer, Gesch. d. deuischen Lit., 6th ed., pp. 33-36, Eng. trans.. Vol. 1, pp. 28-32; Waitz, Das Leben des Ulfilas, 1840; Krafft, iTii-c/ien- geschichte d. Deutschen Volker, Abth. 1, 1854, and article " Ulfilas," in Herzog, RealencyklopSdie, Vol. 16, 1885. — Tr.
taken as modifications of one and the same language, which, may be called the Keltic. Thus the ancients called both the Germans and the Gauls Kelts ; and in going back farther in order to understand the origin both of the Keltic and the Latin and the Greek, which have many roots in common with the Germanic or Keltic tongues, we may conjecture that this fact arises from the common origin of all these peoples de- scended from the Scythians, who, having come from the Black Sea, passed the Danube and the Vistula, and of whom one part may have gone into Greece, the other have filled Germany and the Gauls ; a consequence of the hypothesis which makes the Europeans come from Asia. The Sarmatian (supposing it to be the Sclavonic) has at least half its origin either Germanic or common with the Germanic. The case appears to be some- what similar, indeed, in the Finnish language, which is that of the most ancient Scandinavians, before the Germanic peoples, i.e. the Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians, had taken possession of the land which is the best and nearest the sea; and the language of the Finns or of the northeast of our continent, which is also that of the Lapps, extends from the German or Norwegian Ocean even to the Caspian Sea (although inter- rupted by the Sclavic peoples which have been thrust in between the two) and has some relation to the Hungarian, having come from the countries which are now in part under the Muscovites. But the Tartar language, which has filled the northeast of Asia, with its variations, appears to have been that of the Huns and Cumans as it is of the Uzbeks or Turkomans, of the Kalmuks and of the Mongols. Now all these languages of Scythia have many roots common among themselves and with ours, and it is found that even the Arabic (under which the Hebrew, the ancient Punic, the Chaldee, the Syriac, the Ethi- opic of the Abyssinians are to be comprised) has so great a number of them and an agreement so manifest with ours that it "cannot be attributed to chance alone, nor even to commerce alonCj^but rather to the migrations of the peoples. So that there is nothing in this to combat and not rather to favor the view of the common origin of all nations, and of a primitive rootTahguage.' If the Hebrew or the Arabic approaches the
1 Leibnitz was the first who, from the point of view of a presentiment of the kindred connection, first of the European, and then of the remaining Ian-
nearest to it, it must be at least much changed, and the German seems to have preserved more completely the natural and (to use the language of Jacob Boehme) the Adamic;^ for if we had the primitive language in its purity, or sufBciently preserved to be recognizable, the reasons of the connections whether natural or of an arbitrary institution would necessa^ rily appear wise and worthy of the primitive author. But supposing that our languages are derivative as regards th'eir foundation, they nevertheless have something primitive in themselves which has arisen from them in relation to new root words ' since formed among them by chance but upon natural grounds. Those which signify the sounds of animals or have come from them furnish examples. Such, for exam- ple, is the Latin coaxare attributed to the frogs, which has some relation to couaquen or quakeii in German. Now it
guages, demanded and himself urged on the comparative study of languages, and in this, as in so many other things, was far in advance of his time. For his linguistic worlt;, c/. Dutens, Leibnit. opera omnia, Vols. 5 and 6.— Tr.
1 Jacob Boehme, 1575-1624, » celebrated theosophist, in whom Protestant mysticism reached its highest point. He is called philosophus teutonicus, and "in reality through him, for the first time in Germany, did philosophy come forward with a characteristic stamp " ; Hegel, Vorlesvng. ii. d. Gesch. d. Philos., Vol. 3, p. 270, 2d ed., Berlin, 1833. O. Pfleiderer, Eeligionsphilosophie, Yo], 1, p. 20, 2d ed., Berlin, 1883, says, "The theosophy of Boehme shows itself as the direct forerunner of the metaphysic of Leibnitz, 1646-1716, Schelling, 1775- 1854, Baader, 1765-1841, Schopenhauer, 1788-1860, etc." For his philosophy, etc., cf. his Sdmintliche Werke, hrsg. v. K. W. Schiebler, Leipzig, 1831-47, 2d ed., 1861 sq. ; also Hegel, op. cit., Voh 3, pp. 270-297; Stockl, Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mittelalters, Vol.3, pp. 569-608, §§ 122-128; O. Pfleiderer, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 15-23 , Eng. trans.. Vol. 1, pp. 13-23 ; B. Piinjer, Gesch. d. Christ. Religions- philos., 1880-83, Vol. 1, pp. 180-194; Eng. trans., Vol. 1, pp. 243-265, T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1887. Vaughan, Hours loith the Mystics, Vol. 2, pp. 79-125, 3d ed., London : 1879. According to Boehme, cf. Das drey/ache Leben, chap. 8, 2-4 ; Princ, 10, 8-12 ; Mj/st. Mag., chap. 15, 1-9, etc. ; a"iso Stockl, op. cit, §§ 125, 126, Vol. 3, pp. 586 sg. ; Adam, who stands here in Leibnitz's text " as the symbol and representative of the original unity of the race," and of its lan- guage, " was destined to propagate his race in angel-like purity without endangering its integrity." Leibnitz, while acquainted with Boehme's writ- ings, made little use of them in his own thinking, and speaks thus of them in alettertoFr. S. Loeffler, Jan. 13,1693, c/. Dutens, op. c!(.. Vol. 5, p. 409: "Tlie controversies over the opinions of Boehme I consider idle, and think that he neither understood himself nor have others understood him." — Tr.
2 Gerhardt's text reads: "Qui leur est survenu par rapport k des mots radicaux nouveaux, formes depuis chez elles," etc. Erdraann and Jacques read: "qui leur est survenu par rapport a des mots radicaux et nouveaux radicaux formes depuis chez elles," etc.; i.e. new root words and new roots since formed among them, etc. — Tr.
seems that the noise of these animals is the primordial root of other words of the German language. Eor as these animals make much noise, the term is attributed to-day to idle talk and to babblers, who are called quakeler in the diminutive form ; but apparently this same word quaken was formerly under- stood in a good sense and signified all sorts of sounds made with the mouth not even excepting speech. And as these sounds or noises of animals are an evidence of life, and as we know thereby before we see it that there is life there, quek in old German has come to signify life or living, as may be observed in the most ancient books, and there are also traces of the same in the modern language, for Quecksilber is quick- silver (vif-argent) , and erquicken is to strengthen, and, as it were, to vivify or recreate after exhaustion or some great labor. Certain weeds are called also in Low German Quaken, alive so to speak and running, as they say in German, which spread and propagate themselves easily in the fields to the detriment of the grain; and in English giw'cA;/?/ means promptly and in a wide-awake manner. Thus we may consider that as regards these words the German language may pass as the primitive, the ancients having no need to borrow elsewhere a sound which is the imitation of that of the frogs. And there are many others in which the same thing appears. Por it seems that the ancient Germans, Kelts, and other peoples allied to them have employed by a natural instinct the letter R to signify a violent movement and a noise like that of this letter.^ It appears in pe'cu, flao, rinnen, riiren (Jluere), rutir {fluxion), the Rhine, Rhone, Roer (Rhenus, Rhodanus, Erida- nus. Euro), rauben {rapere, ravir), Radt {rota), radere {raser), muschen, a word difficult to translate into French ; it signifies a noise like that which the wind or a passing animal stirs up in the leaves or the trees, or is made by a trailing dress ; reckken (to stretch with violence), whence it comes that reichen IS to reach ; that der Rick signifies a long stick or perch useful for suspending anything, in this kind of Plat-tiitsch or Low Saxon which is (spoken) near Brunswick; that Rige, Reihe,
^ Of. Plato, Cratylus, 434 sq.; English Translation by B. .Jowett; 2d ed., 1875, Vol. 2, p. 259 sq.; 3d ed., 1892, Vol. 1, p. 381 sq., where the author has already made an attempt, similar to that made here and many times before by Leibnitz, to fix the original significance of single letters in the formation of words. — Tk.
regula, regere, refer to length or a straight course ; and that Eeck has signified a thing or person very extended and long, and in particular a giant, and then a powerful and rich man, as it appears in the reich of the Germans and in the riche or ricco of the Semi-Latins. In Spanish ricos homhres means the nobles or chief men ; and this makes it plain at the same time how metaphor, synecdoche, and metonymy have caused words to pass from one signification to another without our being able always to trace them. This noise and violent movement is noticed also in Riss (rupture) with which the Latin rumpo, the Greek priyvvfu, the French arracher, the Italian straccio are connected. Now as the letter R signifies naturally a violent movement, the letter L designates a gentler one. Thus we see that children and others who find the E too harsh or too difii- cult to pronounce substitute for it the letter L, saying, for example, mo7i Uvelend pile} This gentle movement appears in leben (vivre — live), laben (conforter — comfort, faire vivre — make live), Had, lenis, lentus {lent — slow), liehen {aimer — love), Icmffen {glisser promptement comme I'eau qui coule — to glide quickly like flowing water), lain (glisser — to touch lightly, Idbitur uncta vadis abies^), legen {mettre doucement — to place gently), whence comes liegen (coucher — to lie down), lage or laye (un lit, comme tin lit de pierres — a bed, as a bed of rocks). Lay-stein {pierre d, couches, ardoise — slate), lego, ich lese (je remasse ce qu'on a mis — ■ I collect what has been invested, it is the opposite of mettre — ■ to place, and then je lis — I read, and finally among the Greeks je parle — I speak'), Lavb (feuille — leaf), a thing easy to stir, to which are related also laj), lid,^ lenJien, luo, Xww {soloo), leien^ (in Low-Saxon) to dis- solve, to melt like the snow, whence the Leine has its name, a river of Hanover, which, rising in the mountainous coun- tries, is greatly enlarged by the melted snows ; not to speak of an infinite number of other similar appellations, which prore that there is something natural in the origin of words which indicates a relation between things and the sounds and move-
1 I.e. " Reverend pere." — Tr. 2 Qf, Vergil, .Sii. 8, 91. — Tb.
3 Erdmann and Jacqnes omit: "Et puis je lis et enfin chez les Grecs je parle," the reading of Gerliardt. — Tr.
< Gerhardt's reading; Erdmanu and Jacqnes have "llel." — Te. 5 Gerhardt's reading ; Erdmann and Jacques have " lien." — Tk.
ments of tlie vocal organs ; and it is furthermore for tliat reason that the letter L joined to other nouns makes their diminutives with the Latins, the Semi-Latins, and the High Germans. But it must not be pretended that this reason can be noticed everywhere, for the lion, the lynx, the wolf, are anything but gentle. But it may be attached to another acci- dent, the speed (/ait/), which makes them feared or compels flight ; as if the one who sees such an animal coming should cry to the others : lauf(fuyez! — fly!); besides by many acci- dents and changes the majority of words are very much altered and diverted from their pronunciation and original signification. Ph. Yet an example would make it better understood. Th. Here is one plain enough and which comprehends many others. The word aeil (eye) and its parentage may serve us. To show it I will begin a little further back. A (the first letter) followed by a little aspiration makes Ah, and as this is an emission of the air which produces a sound clear enough at its beginning and then vanishing, this sound naturally sig- nifies a light breath (spiritus lenis) when A and H are not very strong. Thence it is that aw, aer, aura, haugh, halare, haleine, ar/ios, Atheni, Odem (in German) have had their origin. But as water is also a fluid and makes a noise, it has come (it seems) that ah made rougher by doubling, i.e. aha ox ahha, has been taken as water. The Teutons and other Kelts, the better to indicate the motion, have placed their W before both. Thence ivehen, Wind, vent, indicate the motion, of the air, and waten, vadum, water, motion of or in the water. But to return to aha, it appears to be (as I have said) a kind of root which means water. The Icelanders, who preserve some- what of the Scandinavian Teutonic, have lessened the aspira- tion of some by saying aa; others, who say Aken (meaning Aix, Aquae grani'^), have increased it, as do also the Latins in their aqua, and the Germans in certain places, who say ach m compositions to indicate water, as when Sdurarzadi ^ means black water, Biberach water of the beavers. And instead of Wiser or Weser they said Wiseraha in the old titles, and Wisurach ^ among the ancient inhabitants, of which the Latins
2 CJerhardt's reading; Erdmaiin and Jacques read: " Schwartzach," "Wiaerach." — Tk.
have made Vimrgis, as from Her, llerach, they have made Margus. From aqua, aigues, auue the French have finally made eau, which they pronounce oo, in which there no longer remains anything of its origin. Auioe, Auge with the Ger- mans is to-day a place which water often overflows, suitable for pastnrage, locus irriguus, pcuscuus; but more particularly it signifies an island, as in the name of the monastery of Reichenaic {Atigia dives), and many others. And this (process) must have gone on among many of the Teutonic and Keltic peoples, for thence it has come that everything which is, as it were, isolated in a kind of plain has been called Auge or Otige, oculus. Thus it is they name spots of oil upon water among the G-ermans ; and among the Spaniards ojo is a hole. But Auge, Ooge, oculus, occhio, etc., have been applied more particularly to the ceil, as it were, pre-eminently, which makes this isolated brilliant foramen in the countenance ; and doubt- less the French ceil comes from it also, but its origin is not at all recognizable, unless by the concatenation I have just given ; and the ofj.fjLa and oi//ts of the Greeks appear to come from the same source. Oe or Oelancl is an island among tbe inhabitants of the North, and there is some trace of it in the Hebrew, where "i^, Ai, is an island. Bochart ^ believed that the Phoenicians derived the name which he thinks they gave to the jEgean Sea, full of islands, from the same source. Augere, augmentation, comes also from Auue or Auge, i.e. from the effusion of waters, as ooJcen, auken in old Saxon was to augment ; and Augustus, when speaking as Emperor, was trans- lated by Ooker. The river of Brunswick, which comes from the Hartz Mountains, and consequently is much subject to sudden accretions, is called Ocker, formerly Oua,cra. And I mention in passing that the names of rivers, having ordinarily
1 Samuel Bochart, 1.599-1667, an eminent French scholar and Protestant theologian, a distinguished orientalist, and a man of profound erudition, thoroughly familiar with all the principal oriental languages, including Hebrew, Chaldaic, Syriac, and Arabic, and so enthusiastic in linguistic studies that even when far advanced in years he desired to learn Ethiopic. His favorite study was Phoenician, and tliough modest and candid he seeks to derive all languages etymologically " from the Hebrew or Phosnician," a pro- cedure whicli led him into many fanciful etymologies. Cf. Dutens, Leiinii. opera omnia, Vol. 6, Pt, IT., pp. 223, 226. His complete works were published under the title, Sam. Bochart, opera omnia. Leyden, 1675, 2 vols, fol., 1692, 1712, 3 vols. fol. Leibnitz prized and often cited them. — Tr.
come from tlie farthest known antiquity, show best the old language and the ancient inhabitants ; hence they deserve particular investigation. And languages in general being the most ancient monuments of peoples, before writing and the arts, show best the origin of cognations and migrations. Hence etymologies much extended would be curious and sig- nificant; but it is necessary to unite the languages of many peoples, and not to make too many leaps from one nation to another far distant without having good verifications, in which process it is especially useful to have intervening peoples as guarantees. And in general credence must be given to ety- mologies only when there is a quantity of concurrent evidence; to do differently is to goropise.